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This chapter focuses on the means of environmental regulation-the techniques regulators use to reduce pollution. It discusses traditional regulation (often called command-and-control regulation), the economic theory undergirding market-based environmental regulation, and increased use of market mechanisms. This treatment of market mechanisms will consider them in institutional context, showing how a multilevel governance system implements market mechanisms.
Traditional Regulation
Prior to 1970, common law courts played a leading role in addressing environmental problems in many countries. When pollution invaded property rights, property owners would ask judges to award damages and order pollution abatement, claiming that the pollution constituted a trespass-an invasion of property, or a nuisance -an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of property.
1 Ironically, as environmental problems grew worse, common law adjudication of environmental disputes became less effective, because proving that a particular property owner had caused a significant harm became difficult when many different polluters contributed to an environmental problem.
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In the 1970s, developed country governments responded to growing environmental problems by enacting statutes creating environmental ministries and authorizing them to regulate significant pollution sources. Sometimes these statutes contained specific requirements for specific industries, but more often they authorized environmental ministries to regulate polluters under general criteria established in a statute. Many of these statutes aimed to fully protect public health and the environment.
But they often approached these lofty goals incrementally, relying heavily upon technology-based regulation. Under this technology-based approach, environmental ministries set regulatory requirements for particular industries or firms that reflect pollution reduction technologies' capabilities. The resulting technology-based regulations secured significant reductions in environmental hazards in spite of population and consumption increases, even though they often did not fully protect public health and the environment.
Most commentators refer to technology-based regulation as command and control regulation. This term suggests that environmental ministries regularly dictate technological choices to regulated firms. Technology-based regulation, however, offers some technological flexibility, when doing so is compatible with enforcement.
Environmental regulators usually implement technology-based standards through performance standards, which require polluters to meet a particular pollution reduction target, rather than dictate use of a preferred technology. This approach gives polluters the freedom to choose any technology they like, as long as they meet the quantitative pollution level required by the regulator. For example, when the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established a New Source Performance Standard for sulfur dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants, it required that plant operators either meet a pounds of sulfur dioxide per million British Thermal Units target or a percentage reduction requirement for sulfur dioxide emissions. 3 While EPA anticipated that most utilities would employ "scrubbers" to meet this target, this performance standard allowed them to choose any type of scrubber or any other technology that would meet this target. 4 In cases where monitoring of pollution levels was not feasible, however, environmental ministries often impose "work practice" standards-i.e. standards that dictate a particular technological approach. 5 For example, when EPA sought to regulate asbestos emissions stemming from building demolition, it recognized that measurement of these emissions would be impossible, so it required contractors to follow a specific set of procedures, such as wetting the asbestos, which would reduce emissions. Thus, traditional regulation relies heavily on technology-based rules implemented through a mixture of performance and work practice standards.
Traditional regulation often relies upon uniform performance standards, i.e.
standards that require the same amount of pollution reduction from each plant in a regulated industry. Uniform standards allow regulators to address pollution from an entire category of pollution sources in a single proceeding and create a level playing field for competitors within an industry.
Commentators often invoke a dichotomy between command-and-control regulation and market mechanisms when discussing environmental regulation. pollution control devices and services, thus creating an environmental services market. 8 Conversely, we shall see that market mechanisms, like traditional regulation, generally depend on effective government decision-making for their success.
In the 1980s, governance philosophies began to shift around the world, especially in English speaking countries. President Reagan (US) and Prime Minister Thatcher (UK) glorified free markets and adopted policies reflecting skepticism of government regulation. They enjoyed intellectual support from a burgeoning law and economics movement. The law and economics movement tended to see free markets as a governance model and adopted economic efficiency, rather than full protection of public health and the environment, as a major goal. In the United States, companies hoping to escape the burdens of strict government regulation funded think tanks to spread the free market gospel. These think tanks supported pro-business government officials, like President Reagan, in their efforts to reform or eliminate regulation.
The rise of neoliberalism-the cultural exaltation of free markets-fueled criticism of traditional environmental regulation and a call for reform. Neoliberal critics referred to traditional regulation as "command and control" regulation, thus suggesting that it was overly prescriptive. Critics derided uniform standards as a "one-size-fits-all" approach, suggesting the need for greater flexibility. And many of them advocated two primary reforms-increased use of market mechanisms as the means of environmental regulation, this chapter's theme, and use of cost-benefit analysis as a check on environmental regulation's stringency, the topic of Chapter 15. By convention, the term "market mechanisms" refers primarily to pollution taxes and environmental benefit trading. This part will discuss the economic theory underlying these two approaches. It will then briefly address three other approaches sometimes discussed as market mechanisms -the offering of subsidies for low polluting technologies, the use of information to create incentives for environmental improvement and a more radical reform, and simple abandonment of regulation by environmental ministries in favor of voluntary regulation (which is covered more extensively elsewhere in this book).
Economic Theory and Market Mechanisms
Market-based approaches address an efficiency problem arising from the use of uniform standards. Pollution control costs usually vary significantly from plant to plant even within the same industry. This implies that an approach that shifted emission reductions from facilities with high pollution control costs to facilities with low pollution control costs could achieve any given industry-wide regulatory target at lower cost than a uniform standard would. Market-based mechanisms encourage this sort of shift thereby increasing the cost effectiveness of pollution control.
Economists often recommend that governments levy a tax on each pound of pollution emitted in order to create an incentive for cost effective pollution abatement.
Once a government establishes a tax rate, polluters will presumably implement pollution reduction projects when such projects have marginal costs less than that of paying the tax. Conversely, polluters with pollution control options costing more than the tax rate presumably would choose to pay the tax and continue polluting. Thus, a pollution tax efficiently shifts reductions from high to low cost facilities. marginal control costs. The shift of reductions to low cost facilities implies that private firms will achieve the government's chosen regulatory target at lower cost than would be possible under a uniform standards approach.
A well-designed environmental benefit trading provides more certainty about the quantity of reductions than a pollution tax. But this quantitative mechanism provides less certainty about cost than a pricing mechanism like a pollution tax.
This approach usually provides only limited incentives to reduce emissions. enacted a "Right-to-Know" law requiring chemical companies and other large manufacturers to report their releases of toxic chemicals into the environment. The law required EPA to create a Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) to report the data to the public.
Subsequently, many OECD countries enacted similar mandatory disclosure laws. When firms implementing this law sought, often for the first time, to fully characterize their releases of toxic chemicals into the environment they discovered more releases than they anticipated. Many firms responded to these revelations with voluntary efforts to reduce some of these releases. 11 We need more research into what motivated these decisions.
The suggestion that the Right-to-Know Law constitutes a market mechanism implies that firms feared that high numbers in the TRI would trigger declining sales or stock prices.
But it is at least possible that more general concerns about reputation in the community, fears of more stringent government regulation, or even genuine concern about their impact on the health of people working in or living near their facilities might have motivated them. These motivations might imply that reputational, regulatory, or moral incentives play a greater role than economic ones.
The European Union has spearheaded the use of eco-labels to inform consumers about the environmental attributes of products, in hopes of motivating consumers to make In continental Europe, by contrast, significant support existed for environmental taxation in some countries, in keeping with the recommendations of many experts.
Support for environmental benefit trading, however, developed later. Environmental benefit trading has become a much more widely used approach, primarily because of the United States' influence. The United States began experimenting with trading when it adopted project-based trading programs in the late 1970s. These programs treated facilities generating air emissions as if they were encased in a bubble, focusing on plant-wide emissions, rather than achieving pollution reduction targets at each smokestack or other pollution source within a facility. The bubble programs (as they were called) allowed polluters to increase pollution at some units within a facility, if they reduced pollution sufficiently at other units within the same facility.
The bubble programs produced large cost savings, but also a lot of evasion of emission reduction obligations. 12 They failed (environmentally speaking) largely because they allowed pollution sources that were not subject to caps or strict monitoring of pollution levels to produce and sell emission reduction credits. This approach gave rise to a host of problems. to pollution increases at competing facilities, which could ramp up production to meet the demand the closed facility had previously met. Because no cap applied to the industry as a whole, the programs could not account for these demand shifts, which would in effect mean that, once again, bubbles lost planned emission reductions.
In 1990, however, the United States created a model program, the acid rain program. 13 Because of its excellent design it garnered the support of many environmental lobbies, including the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), which in the past had been a technically sophisticated opponent of trading. This program capped the pollution levels of the major sources of sulfur dioxide, the principle pollutant responsible for acid rain, at levels representing a significant emission reduction. It also imposed stringent monitoring requirements and generally only allowed well-monitored capped sources to generate credits. This program produced significant pollution reduction at low cost and with exceptionally high compliance rates. The EU also has adopted a "linking directive," which allows European countries and their nationals to purchase credits realized through emission reduction projects undertaken outside the EU. Thus, the ETS has become a hybrid program, combining elements of the cap-and-trade approach successfully employed in the United States to address acid rain with crediting from project-based mechanisms that have a lot in common with the failed bubble programs.
The Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) exemplifies the problematic nature of project-based trading. This mechanism allows project developers to earn pollution reduction credits through pollution reducing projects in developing countries, even though these countries are not subject to caps on their emissions. The
Kyoto Protocol seeks to avoid the problems of the bubble programs by requiring that projects provide "additional" emission reductions. 16 But the CDM's Executive Board (the primary oversight body) has approved many projects where only a tiny fraction of project revenue comes from credit purchases. Under such circumstances, it is very likely that these projects would have been undertaken without the availability of pollution reduction credit. 17 Once the credit is approved and sold, however, the purchaser will use the credit to justify not making an otherwise required reduction. Thus, an emission reduction is lost and no additional emission reduction is realized to compensate for this loss. Recent research suggests that these project-based trades have produced a significant loss of emission reductions. 18 This subject, however, certainly requires additional 16 care about its quality, whether the government does or not. If they are not well made they will wear out. This intrinsic concern for quality acts as a force encouraging the producers of ordinary consumer goods to make goods of reasonably good quality. Poor quality emission credits, however, offer the cheapest and best compliance option, unless government regulators recognize their poor quality and disallow their use. 22 Early trading proponents claimed that trading not only increases regulation's cost effectiveness, but also sparks more innovation than traditional regulation ever did. 23 This claim, in its simplest form at least, has fallen into disrepute. 24 Trading reduces incentives to innovate among polluters with high control costs (they can escape by purchasing credits), while increasing incentives for innovation at those with low costs (they can go "beyond compliance" in order to sell credits to the escapees). 25 Therefore, the innovation picture is complex.
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Trading eliminates any incentive to employ innovations costing more than the relatively low cost generated by the permit market. 27 This can eliminate incentives for the most technologically advanced innovations, which often prove expensive. 28 On the other hand, the increased flexibility trading provides can provide incentives to employ some types of low cost innovation that would be lacking in a less flexible system.
Careful empirical work on the acid rain trading program in the United States shows less innovation in the acid rain program than in the traditional regulatory program that preceded it. 29 The scholars reaching this conclusion have disagreed about whether trading may nevertheless have changed the type of innovation. A tension exists between maximizing short term cost effectiveness and maximizing long-term technological advancements that depend on initially expensive innovation. Emissions trading maximizes short term cost effectiveness, not necessarily long-term technological advancement.
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We clearly need more and better research that seeks to compare emissions trading's track record in stimulating innovation with that of alternative approaches. Such research must take care to distinguish innovation, the introduction of new technology, from diffusion, the spread of old technology and carefully compare 25 Innovation can be important in advancing our capabilities to meet significant environmental challenges over time. 32 On the other hand, incremental change, which well designed trading programs encourage in a cost effective way, can sometimes prove useful.
We have some experience with special kinds of incentive mechanisms that may perform better than trading or taxes alone in spurring innovation. 33 One can use negative economic incentives to spur positive economic incentives. 34 An example comes from
France's use of effluent fees to fund waste water treatment, with very good results.
Systems that require a deposit on beverage containers and then pay for returned empty containers have spurred a lot of clean-up of litter, not an especially innovative response technologically, but one that suggests the power of combining positive and negative price incentives. 35 California has proposed a system where purchasers of high emission vehicles would pay a fee that would subsidize purchase of low emission vehicles. 36 Such feebate systems may powerfully influence innovation as they simultaneously punish polluters and reward cleanup. Germany has enacted a law requiring manufacturers to take back and properly dispose of packaging accompanying products. This approach creates a powerful incentive to minimize packaging by forcing an internalization of disposal costs, which usually have been externalized.
Environmental benefit trading also raises environmental justice issues in many contexts. Even in the United States, which has become almost religious in its devotion to trading approaches, the government has often recognized that trading of carcinogenic pollutants raises serious ethical issues. Under a trading approach, a polluter can leave its 
Multilevel Trading
Instrument choice and implementation of the chosen instrument take place in the context of a proliferation of multilevel governance. At the same time, once governments select market mechanisms, the selection and the ideology underlying the selection, can influence governance structures.
The Kyoto Protocol offers perhaps the best vehicle for exploring the layering of governance levels. For choices about whether to use trading and how to implement it when it is used in this context involve numerous levels of government as well as novel private sector roles. This multiplicity, however, is not unique to the Kyoto Protocol.
Rather, the Kyoto Protocol offers an especially intricate example of multileveled governance.
In the past, many international agreements have limited the pollution coming from the countries involved without specifying the mechanisms for limiting pollution. 37 It would be possible to craft a climate change agreement that established reduction targets for national governments, but said nothing about how they should achieve these targets.
Such an approach would leave countries quite free to choose between traditional regulation, emissions trading, pollution taxes, and even voluntary approaches, as long as the countries met their internationally agreed upon goals.
The parties to the Kyoto Protocol, however, decided to address the instrument choice issue in the international agreement itself, rather than only on the national level.
As a result, the Kyoto Protocol contains no less than three emissions trading programs, allowing developed countries, and often their regulated firms, to purchase credits from 37 Because the EU trading scheme links up with the "project-based mechanisms"
(the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation programs that garner credits from individual projects), the integrity of the scheme depends upon effective oversight of claims of emission reduction credits earned around the world. The Kyoto Protocol has spawned a complex multi-level governance structure seeking to assure these credits' integrity. addressing climate change, including the initiation of emissions trading programs. 42 The first program, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), consists of an agreement of governors of the northeastern states to require emission reductions from their electric utilities and allow trading to reduce the cost of these reductions. 43 This agreement not only offers an example of regional governance, it embodies multilevel governance within the region. The agreement creates a "Regional Organization" to perform central coordinating tasks, such as auctioning allowances. 44 Furthermore, the regional agreement resolves very important issues, such as the amount of reductions required, on the regional level. 45 But it leaves many important decisions, (e.g. how many of the allowances to auction, how to use revenue realized from the auction) to states within the region.
California and other states also are currently moving toward implementing emissions trading schemes. 46 Of course, all of this leads to coordination difficulties. The European Commission has been in contact with California and RGGI staff to discuss coordination issues. When the United States federal government enacts an emissions trading scheme, it will face an issue of how to coordinate its effort with the state programs already underway. The European Union has already faced a similar issue arising from an early emissions trading program in the United Kingdom, which predated the EU ETS.
Those seeking to coordinate these programs will face the familiar issues regulators confront in an age of globalization and multilevel governance, albeit in a slightly different context. Many of those running these programs have accepted free trade principles at the heart of neoliberalism, and think that a well coordinated global market would be better than a series of national and sub-national markets. Such coordination can maximize the cost savings trading programs can deliver. 47 At the same time, such coordination may spark a race-to-the-bottom, as countries that restrict credit sales into their markets to make sure that they meet strict standards of environmental integrity may come under pressure to avoid interference with the global market in credits. 48 Already, most jurisdictions generating credits for sale in international markets exercise very little oversight, because of competitiveness concerns. If project developers cannot develop their preferred projects in one country, they can just go elsewhere.
Government bodies will face conflicting pressures. Lovers of free markets will clamor to reduce transaction costs that might impede trades.
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But supporters of environmental integrity will insist on raising transaction costs to pay for the oversight needed to make sure that only environmentally sound projects generate credits. 50 Hence, international environmental benefit trading markets create problems similar to those associated with globalization more generally. or not regulators employ market mechanisms. But when they choose market mechanisms that traverse national borders, they greatly complicate the governance challenges they face. And the neoliberalism that supports environmental benefit trading generally also supports the broadest possible trading markets. Environmental benefit trading offers terrific potential for cost reduction, but poses significant challenges for regulators, which grow exponentially when the mechanism is globalized.
Conclusion
Market-based instruments have become increasingly important as neoliberalism has advanced. While these instruments provide a cost effective way of realizing environmental improvements, they depend on government design and enforcement for their efficacy. Increasingly, designers of emissions trading programs in particular find themselves operating in a complex context of multilevel governance.
